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SCOPE OF TAINT UNDER THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE OF
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
In the 1963 Term the United States Supreme Court handed down two
landmark decisions affecting the privilege against self-incrimination.1 In
Malloy v. Hogan the Court held that "the Fifth Amendment's exception
from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against abridgement by the States.. " 2
On the same day the Supreme Court delivered a second opinion
which was a logical consequence of the Malloy decision. In Murphy v.
Waterfront Commn - the Court extended the protection of the fifth amend-
ment 4 to those cases in which the privilege against self-incrimination was
claimed because of the possibility of prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction. 5
Prior to Murphy the so-called "dual sovereignties" rule dictated that a
witness in one jurisdiction could not claim his privilege with respect to a
foreign crime because "the powers of the General Government, and of the
State, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial
limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and in-
dependently of each other, within their respective spheres.. ,, 6 In
overturning this rule, the Murphy Court reasoned that it would defeat the
policies of the privilege against self-incrimination to allow a witness who
now has the privilege under both state and federal jurisdictions to be
"'whipsawed into incriminating himself under both state and federal
law,'" '7 a possibility made particularly acute by widespread interjurisdic-
tional cooperation in law enforcement. Murphy therefore concluded that
"the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state wit-
ness against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal
IMalloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) ; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52 (1964).
2 378 U.S. at 6.
3378 U.S. 52 (1964).
4 Hereinafter, references to the fifth amendment refer only to the particular clause
in question-the privilege against self-incrimination.
5 "Foreign" is used to characterize any jurisdiction, state or federal, outside of
the compelling jurisdiction.
6 Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858). See generally Grant,
Federalism and Self-Incrimination: I & II, 4 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 549 (1957); 5 U.C.L.
A.L. REv. 1 (1958) ; Kroner, Self Incrimination: The External Reach of the Privilege,
60 COLum. L. REv. 816 (1960). The case law based upon the dual sovereignties rule
is best exemplified by United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931) (federal
government can compel testimony incriminating under state law) ; Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487, 492 (1944) (federal courts can admit evidence compelled under
a state grant of immunity) ; Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 379 (1958) (state
can compel testimony incriminating under federal law).
7 378 U.S. at 55 (quoting from the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in
Knapp v. Schweitzer, mupra note 6, at 385).
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witness against incrimination under state as well as federal law." 8 More
narrowly, the Court held that a witness before the New York-New Jersey
Waterfront Commission was entitled to remain silent because of his jus-
tifiable fear, in light of the existing law, that anything he said might be
incriminating under federal law.9 In what might be considered a prospec-
tive pronouncement of law, the Court further indicated that a state witness
may be compelled in the future to testify under an appropriate state immu-
nity statute without there being any violation of his privilege against self-
incrimination, since the federal government will not be permitted to
prosecute that witness if it must rely on his testimony or on any of its
fruits.'0 In establishing this rule, the Court declared that a prosecuting
jurisdiction must show that its prosecution is based upon sources inde-
pendent of the substance of the witness' testimony: "Once a defendant
demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant of immunity, to
matters related to the federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the
burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that
they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence." 11
The requirement of such a showing would seem to be the best possible
resolution of the interests of the individual, the investigating jurisdiction,
and the prosecuting jurisdiction. Starting from the basic premise that the
privilege against self-incrimination extends across jurisdictional lines, the
Court could have adopted any one of four rules: the witness is entitled to
remain silent,'2 the investigating jurisdiction may compel testimony but,
if it does, the witness is immune from prosecution in that or any other
jurisdiction,'3 the witness may be compelled to testify, but the testimony
may not be used by any jurisdiction in a prosecution of that witness, or the
witness may be compelled to testify, but his testimony and its fruits may
be excluded in any future prosecution. Had the Court chosen the right
to remain silent as the vehicle of the privilege, the investigative aspect of
state or federal law enforcement might have been irreparably damaged
because of the impossibility of compelling testimony, the latter being an
important means of securing legislative information. Had the Court
selected the compulsion-immunity resolution of the conflict, the prosecut-
ing aspect of a jurisdiction's law enforcement would have been severely
hindered. Had the Court chosen exclusion of the testimony only, and not
of its fruits, the constitutional rights of the individual would have been
8 378 U.S. at 77-78.
) Id. at 79.
'oId. at 79 & n.18.
11 Id. at 79 n. 18.
12 The traditional form of the fifth amendment privilege is the right to remain
silent: "[N]or shall . . . [he] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
13 This resolution would be similar in effect to the various immunity statutes.
For a list of such federal statutes see Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in
Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568,
1611-12 (appendix A) (1963).
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sacrificed. On the other hand, the Court's decision to choose the more
complete compulsion-exclusion method of effectuating the privilege against
self-incrimination safeguards the individual's rights and leaves interested
jurisdictions free to investigate crime, while at the same time leaving other
potential prosecuting jurisdictions in the same position in which they would
have been had the witness been allowed to remain silent.
The Murphy resolution, however, does pose a possible threat to effec-
tive law enforcement. A jurisdiction which decides to compel testimony
[J-1] has made an election between information and prosecution, and has
chosen the former. A potential prosecuting jurisdiction [J-2], on the
other hand, has had no voice in this determination yet will be affected
thereby to the extent that it will be required to forego prosecution when
it cannot meet its burden of proving that its prosecution was in no way
based upon the testimony compelled in J-1. Some commentators believe
that the burden placed upon the prosecution to show that its case is based
upon independent sources of information would greatly hinder prosecu-
torial efforts.' 4 The major aspect of this problem is the scope of taint:
How independent or how attenuated from the original "contaminated"
source (the compelled testimony elicited in J-1) must the relevant source
be. It is only in the answer that the Court formulates to this question that
any actual hindrance to effective law enforcement will become discernible.
The doctrine of taint is one element of the rule of exclusion. This
rule provides that evidence which has been seized illegally 15 must be
excluded from use in any trial of the defendant whose constitutional rights
have been violated. The doctrine of taint extends this rule by declaring that
other evidence (characterized as "fruit of the poisonous tree") discovered
by use of the originally illegally seized evidence must likewise be excluded.'"
The exact breadth and scope of taint in the area of self-incrimination are
as yet unclear. As it relates to illegal searches and seizures, coerced con-
fessions, wiretapping and other forms of primary illegality,' 7 the case law
in this area indicates a judicial reluctance to follow to its logical conclusion
the labeling of evidence as fruit of a poisonous tree 18-a tendency which
14 See, e.g., Comment, Self-Incriidnation and the States: Restriking the Balalwe,
73 YALE L.J. 1491, 1494 (1964).
15 The rule also applies to coerced' confessions. The Supreme Court, however,
has not passed on the question of taint as it applies to this area.
16 The doctrine that poisonous fruit spreads further than the product of the
initial illegality has its roots in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385 (1920). "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court but that it shall not be used at all ... " Id. at 392; accord, Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
17 Before Murphy, all the exclusionary rules had been the outgrowth of primary
illegalities such as those mentioned in text. The Murphy exclusionary rule, however,
operates in situations of court sanctioned "seizures." See 378 U.S. at 79.
18 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 954 (1964); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 860 (1963); Benetti v. United States, 97 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1938) ; United
States v. Avila, 227 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Cal. 1963); Kamisar, Illegal Searches or
Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected
Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 78, 95.
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holds within narrow bounds the distance from which the taint spreads out
from the primary illegality. In other words, the requirement that evidence
used in prosecutions have an origin independent of the primary illegality
is to a certain extent disregarded. Courts have applied tests which ask
whether the evidence could or would have been discovered through inde-
pendent legal means, rather than seeking to discover whether the evidence
did in fact have an independent origin.19 However, there is reason to
believe that in the area of the privilege against self-incrimination it will be
more likely for fruit to be found poisonous than is presently the case in the
area of primary illegality. This observation follows from the fact that in
the area of primary illegality the exclusionary rule is based principally upon
the concept of deterrence, while in the area of the privilege against self-
incrimination the rule is intended to prevent harm to the particular
individual 2 0
The thrust of the exclusion cases dealing with primary illegality, most
of which have been concerned with search and seizure, is that the only way
to enforce the constitutional rights involved is to exclude the fruits of
violations of these rights. This conclusion seems evident from the fact
that the Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorado,21 while recognizing that the
fourth amendment applied to the states,22 did not consider exclusion a
necessary part of that amendment.2 3 Only in 1961, when no other means
seemed sufficient to protect the constitutional right in issue, did the Su-
preme Court in Mapp v. Ohio 24 resort to an interpretation of the fourth
amendment which required state courts to exclude illegally seized evidence.
Even though Mapp did not purport to rest its holding upon a factual deter-
mination that there were no other means available to protect the constitu-
tional right, the explicit recognition in the opinion that there were no
other effective means of deterrence to enforce the right2 :5 suggests that
this was the underlying basis of the decision.2 0 References to "deterrence"
and "enforcement" continually appear throughout the cases 27 and articles 23
in this area. Thus it would seem that this exclusionary rule is, in a man-
ner of speaking, not the substance of the right itself but the means by which
19 See Maguire, How To Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth Amendment and the
Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 307, 313 (1964).
20 See Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment
on People vs. Cahan, 43 CALiF. L. REv. 565, 579-82 (1955).
21338 U.S. 25 (1949).
2 21d. at 27-28.
23Id. at 33.
24 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
25 Id. at 652-53.
26 See Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision:
Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. Rmv. 650, 661 (1962).2 7 E.g.; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
28 E.g., Bender, supra note 26, at 661; Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the
Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 334.
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the constitutional right is enforced.29 The exclusion of such evidence can
be said to be derivative; it is remedial, a means to enforce the primary
aspect of the right-that illegal searches and seizures should not take place.
Viewing the primary function of the exclusionary rule as one of deter-
rence and looking at the rule in connection with its logical outgrowth-
that Mapp shall not be applied retroactively -30 -one is forced to the con-
clusion that the right of privacy (freedom from illegal search and seizure)
is, in terms of the exclusionary rule, a right to be looked at as it relates to
society as a whole and not to the particular defendant in question.31 Exclu-
sion is not intended to place the defendant in the position in which he
would have been but for the illegal search and seizure, but is designed
instead to curb police activity in general as it violates the fourth amendment.
If the wrong done to the particular defendant had to be righted, it would
then follow that Mapp must be applied retroactively. That Mapp was not
so applied suggests that the remedying of a particular defendant's rights is
not the reason for exclusion. As Professor Bender has said:
If Mapp v. Ohio must be applied generally to previous trials
[Professor Bender feels it should not], it must be because its rule
is intended directly to relieve those who have actually suffered an
unconstitutional search, not just to provide an indirect means of
assuring general privacy through the removal of an incentive to
police to act improperly. It seems safe to say that the exclusion of
evidence is not a constitutionally required state compensation for
the victims of an unconstitutional search .. . a2
As it relates to the interjurisdictional area of the privilege against self-
incrimination, the exclusionary rule would seem to be both a more integral
part of the privilege and more closely related to the rights of the particular
defendant.33 The exclusionary rule in this area does not implement the
29 But see Allen, Federalism. and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf,
1961 SUPREME CoURT REV. 1, 35.
30 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
31 "The objective of the exclusionary rule is certainly not to compensate the de-
fendant for the past wrong done to him any more than it is to penalize the officer
for the past wrong he has done. The emphasis is forward." Traynor, supra note
28, at 335. And again: "Such a focus to ferret out some violated right of the defendant
suggests, though perhaps unintentionally, that the objective of the exclusionary rule
is to make amends to the defendant. What should be of primary concern is not the
grievances of selected guilty defendants such as land-owners or the gentry of invitees,
but the grievousness of official lawlessness." Ibid.; accord, People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.
2d 434, 439, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955) ; Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure,
Federalism and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. Rlv. 22 (1950).
32 Bender, supra, note 26, at 663-64.
33 In discussing the question of the retroactivity of Mapp, Professor Bender dis-
tinguished between a simple fourth amendment violation and one compounded by a
fifth amendment problem: "There is one situation in which the exclusion of evidence
has always been deemed to be constitutionally required without exploration of the
need for police deterrence: when its use would amount to unconstitutional self-
incrimination. . . ." Id. at 664-65.
In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 34 U.S.L. W=zr 4095, 4098 (U.S. Jan.
19, 1966), which refused to apply retroactively the holding in Griffin v. California,
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right of silence but rather forms a substitute for it. It tells the witness
that he must give information to the appropriate authorities, but that his
disclosures will not harm him since he will be placed in the same position he
would have been in had he invoked his constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination and it had been honored. As in the case of immunity stat-
utes, a substitute for the privilege, or, in the Murphy situation, that which
might be considered a reformulation of the privilege, must be at least as
broad as the privilege itself.34 In Counselman v. Hitchcock,35 a case in
which an immunity statute was held unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
noted that:
It [the immunity statute in question] could not, and would not,
prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to
be used in evidence against him . . . , in a criminal proceeding
in such a court. It could not prevent the obtaining and the use
of witnesses and evidence which should be attributable directly
to the testimony he might give under compulsion, and on which
he might be convicted, when otherwise, and if he had refused to
answer, he could not possibly have been convicted.3 6
Because the fifth amendment exclusionary rule is more closely linked
to the rights of the particular defendant and is a more integral part of the
privilege than is the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, courts should
not have the same flexibility in applying it. To fulfill faithfully the consti-
tutional requirement of coextensive breadth, J-2 must be required to use
only that which is in no way casually related to the compelled testimony.
The evidence used must have an entirely independent origin, not the mere
possibility that it could have had such an origin or even that it would have
had such an origin.
The existence of three variations of the poisonous fruit doctrine in
the Supreme Court also bears on this conclusion. The first of these vari-
ations came in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.3 7  In discussing
the prohibition of the use of tainted evidence, the Court in that case said:
380 U.S. 609 (1965), that comment by state prosecutors or judges on defendant's
failure to take the stand violated the fifth amendment, the Supreme Court stated
that "the basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-incrimination do not
relate to protecting the innocent from conviction, but rather to preserving the integrity
of a judicial system in which even the guilty are not to be convicted unless the prose-
cution 'shoulder the load.'" Even if this view is accepted, it is inapplicable to the
interjurisdictional area of the privilege, where the exclusionary rule has as its sole
purpose the restoration of defendant to the position he would have been in had his
testimony not been compelled. See text following this note. It is only because of the
protection afforded the defendant by the exclusionary rule that the M-urphy Court was
willing to permit compulsion of testimony.
34 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892).
35 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
36Id. at 564. (Emphasis added.)
37251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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"Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred
and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent
source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by
the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.
"38 This may be characterized as the "independent source" test.
Some nineteen years later the Supreme Court articulated what ap-
pears to be a second variation of the doctrine. In Nardone v. United
States,39 after reiterating the "independent source" rule of Silverthorne,
the Court went on to observe: "In practice this generalized statement may
conceal concrete complexities. Sophisticated argument may prove a causal
connection between information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and
the Government's proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such con-
nection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint . . ,, 40
This second test redefines the "independent source" test by expanding it.
Its very acceptance of the concept of "attenuation" relaxes the original,
strict test set forth in Silverthorne, since that concept concedes the ex-
istence of taint in admissible evidence but argues that it has become
dissipated.
The third and most recent variation of the taint test was enunciated
by the Supreme Court in 1963 in Wong Sun v. United States.41  The
Court stated:
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous
tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such
a case is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality,
the evidence to which instant objection is made has been core at
by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. . ,, 42
This test goes far beyond the previous two by its acceptance of the
hypothesis that evidence may be admitted even though it might never have
come to the fore but for the original illegality.
43
38 Id. at 392.
39 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
40 Id. at 341.
41371 U.S. 471 (1963).
42 Id. at 487-88.
43 Nardone does not go as far as Wong Sim because it does not articulate the
proposition that evidence may be admissible even if it would not have been exposed
but for the primary illegality. Thus, Nardone can be restricted to instances in which
the evidence used was derived from information obtained from an illegal search and
seizure, but which would have been obtained irrespective of that search through
another, legal channel of information.
For a brief discussion of these three tests in the context of an analysis of Wong
Sun, see Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NF.m
L. R-v. 483, 545 (1963).
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The Supreme Court's articulation of an unqualified "independent
source" test in Murphy would seem to be an implicit rejection of its two
most recent tests and a reaffirmation of the original Silverthorne test.
This conforms to the analysis that views the fifth amendment exclusionary
rule as stricter than the exclusionary rule which sprang from the fourth
amendment. Because it is more strict, the fifth amendment exclusionary
rule is likely to have a more inhibiting effect upon law enforcement than
the Mapp decision had. This, however, would seem ,a necessary result
in light of the different purposes served by the exclusion of evidence under
the fourth and fifth amendments.
